PROPERTY RlGHTS, THE "GANG OF FOUR"
& THE FIFTH VOTE:
STOP THE BEACH RENOURlSHMENT, INC 11. FLORIDA
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INTRODUCTION

In 20 I 0, the Supreme Court of the United States decided the
case of Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department
of Environmental Protection. I Justice Antonil1 Scalia announced
the judgment of the Court. 2 All Justices agreed that Florida had not
violated the Takings Clause of the Federal Constitution's Fifth
Amendment 3 But then, in a plurality opinion, Justice Scaliajoined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito--proposed profound changes in tbe law of "regulatory takings.,,4
The four Justices embraced the views advanced twenty-five years
before by Professor Richard Epstein, which tmdertook to provide
constitutional protection "to each part of an endowment of private
property ... equal to the protection it affords the whole-no more
and no lcss." s
As the spokesman for the Court's four property rights
absolutists, Scalia advanced two novel legal propositions. First, he
argued that federal courts had the power to collaterally attack and
reverse state court decisions which evaded the requirements of the
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l Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S.
Ct. 2592, 2592 (2010).
2 ld. at 2597.
l ld. at 2613. "Justice Stevens took no part in the decision .... " ld.
4 See id. at 260 .1-10 (plurality opinion). Scalia was joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito. !d. at 2597.
5 RICHARD A. EpSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMlNENT DOMAlN 57 ( 1985).
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Takings Clause with pretextual backgrotmd principles of the state's
law of property. 6 Second, he opined that each of the "essential
sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as
property" 7 was a separate, distinct property right, and that any
deprivation of an "established property right" S was a compensable
taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 9 If the "Gang
of Four" to can find a fifth vote, 11 the law of regulatory takings will
be radically revised.
1. REGULATORY TAKINGS

States create real property by granting parcels of land 12 to
private persons 1 3 The "bundle of sticks" that the private owner
receives represents "the extent to which an owner may use or
dispose of the property in question." 14 One stick is the right to

See Stop Ihe Beach, 130 S. ct. at 2608- 10 (plurality opinion).
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164,176 (1979).
8 Slop the Beach , 130 S. Ct. at 2608 (plurality opinion).
9 See id. at 2601-02, 2605, 2608-\0.
IU See Larry M. Elkin, Will Conservatives Challenge Land-Use Rules?,
PALISADESl-fUDSON.COM, http://www.palisadeshudson.com/20 IO/06/wiJI-courtconservatives-challenge-Iand-use-rules/ (last visitcd Feb. 9 2012) (explaining
that Roberts, Thomas, Scalia, and Alito share a common view about private
property costs and takings); see also Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2597
(illustrating that Roberts, Thomas, Scalia, and Alito sharc a common view about
private property costs and takings by joining together in a takings case).
II Justice William BrennaJl'S "Rule of Five" stated that "[f]ive votes can do
anything aroood here. " See Nat Hentoff, Profile of William Brennan: The
Constitutionalist, NEW YOR KER, Mar. 12, 1990, at 60.
12 Constitutional takings jurisprudence applics to personal property and
intellectual property as well as rcal property. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 990 (1984) (trade secrets); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S.
51, 65-68 (1979) (personal property). Stop the Beach Renourishment and most
cases, however, deal with land. See, e.g., Stop the Beach, 130 S.C!. at 2600-01
(dealing with beach property in Florida); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, 1006-07 (1992) (dealing with beach property in South Carolina).
While traditionally ihe same takings jurisprudence applies to all types of
property, there has been some intimation that personal property is less worthy of
constitutional protection. See Lucas , 505 U.S. at 1027-28.
13 Johnson & Graham's v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Whea!.) 543, 587 (1823).
" Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 31 8 (2002).
6
7
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exclusive use; 15 another, the right to income; 16 another, the right to
alienate; 17 and yet another, the right to transfer at death. 18 Owners
of land abutting tidewaters have additional sticks in their bundle,
including the right to access the water l9 and the right to any
gradual sedimentary accretions that raise the edge of their property
above the water level 20
Once private property has been created, the States may not
take it back unless they pay for it 21 According to the constitutional
proscription known as the Takings Clause, "[p ]rivate property
[shall not] be taken ... without just compensation.,, 22 But on the
other hand, state governments retain a residual "police power" to
govern men and things. 23 What if the State, in the exercise of this
regulatory power, limits the owner's use and enjoyment of his laud
and takes some of the property's market value? Mnst compensation
be paid? Such is the regulatory taking connndrum.
Under the original understanding of the Fifth Amendment, real
property was considered to be taken only when a state's agents
physically occupied the premises or ousted the titleholder from
possession 24 There was no such thing as a regulatory taking.
Things changed in the twentieth century.

A. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon (U S. Supreme Court 1922)
Onerous state and local regulations sometimes deprived
landoWllers of their reasonable investment-backed expectations.

15

Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.s. 164, 176 (1979).

16

Andrus, 444 U.S. at 66.

17 JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODucnON TO PROP ERTY 10-1I (2d ed.

200S).
18

See, e.g. , Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 7 17- 18 (1987).

§ 3 1.02(A)(2)
(2d ed. 2008).
20 SINGER, supra note 17, at 174.
21 U.S. CONST. amend. V (made applicable to the states through
Amendment XIV); Stop the Beach Renouri shll1ent, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl.
Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2602 (2010) (plurality opinion).
22 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
23 The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) S04, S27 (1846).
24 William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings
Clause and the Political Process, 9S COLUM. L. REV. 782, 79 1 ( 199S); accord
Lueas v. S.C. Coastal Council, S05 U.S. 1003 ,1028 n.lS (1992).
19 JOHN G. SVRANKLlNG, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW
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Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. lamented this "petty larceny of
the police power,,, 25 and in 1922, he penned an opinion designed to
con'ect the situation. In the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 26 a Pennsylvania statute had prohibited a coal company
from mining a coal seam it owned under streets and buildings. 27
Although the company was not dispossessed, it suffered a
significant economic loss because, " '[ fJor practical purposes, the
right to coal consists in the right to mine it.' ,, 28
Justice Holmes, writing for the Court's majority,29 opined
"that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if [the]
regulation goes too far, it will be recognized as a taking. ,,30 He
ruled that the coal company was constitutionally guaranteed
compensation. 31 In the twentieth ceutury, it had come to pass that
there was such a thing as a regulatory taking.
Dming the next half-centmy, the holding in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. was more or less forgotten or ignored- a clever trope,
but not one demanding vigilant judicial oversight. J2 The Supreme
Comt of the United States made little effort to protect investmentbacked expectations. 33 The Court left to various state courts the

2S Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski (Oct. 22, 1922), in 1
HOLM ES-LASKI LETTERS 338, 338 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963); James
Audley McLaughlin, Majoritariall Th eji ill the Regulatory State, or What~' a
Takings Clause For?, 19 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'y REV. 161 , 162
( I 995},.
6 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 ( 1922).
27 Jd. at 412-13; see 52 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1407(a)-(b) (West 1966).
" Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 414 (quoting Commonwealth ex reI. Keator v.
Clearview Coal Co., 100 A. 820, 820 (Pa. 1917)).
2· 1d. at 412.
JO ld at4 15.
" See id. at 413-15; U.S. CONST. amend. V.
J2 See Sam Evans, Voices from the Desecrated Places: A Journey to End
Mountaintop Removal Mining, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 521, 569 (2010)
("Darren Botello-Samson fOlmd only a single case in which a taking was found
that actually survived appeaL").
3J See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 635 (200 1) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (noting that if investment-backed expectaiions arc given too much
significance in takings law, the state wields too much power).
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detennination of when police power regulations went "too far" so
as to amount to unconstitutional takings. 34
B.Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York (U.s.

Supreme Court 1978)
Things changed in 1978 when the Supreme Court of the
United States developed a balancing test that measmed when "a
state statute that substantially furthers important public policies
[might] so frustrate distinct investment-backed expectations as to
amount to a 'takin
,, 35 In Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
3
City ofNew York, the city's landmark preservation agency denied
Penn Central's request for permission to build a fifty-five story
office tower in the air column atop Grand Central Station 37 PelID
Central's loss was in the $40 to $50 million range. 38
The land beneath Grand Central Station was still used as a rail
yard, and the station building itself served as a passenger depot and
commercial rental space. 39 The Comt's majority engaged in an
"essentially ad hoc, factual inquir[y]"4o and weighed three factors:
(1) the economic impact, (2) the extent of interference with
investment, and (3) "the character of the governmental action.,,41 It
concluded, util izing the balance, that the public benefits of
lillldmark preservation outweighed the pri vate economic burden on
Penn Central and that no compensation was duc for the "partial
taking.,,42

f .'

34 See Kathryn E. Kovacs, Accepting the Relegation of Takings Claims to
State Courts: The Federal Courts' Misguided Attempts to Avoid Preclusion
Under Williamson County, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1,2 (1999) (outlining a problem
that developed after a Supreme Court decision forced plaintiffs to file takings

claims in state courts).
JS Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127
(1978).
36 [d. at 104.
37 [d. at 116- 17.
38 See id. at 116 C'UGP promised to pay Penn Central $1 mi llion annually
durin\\ construction and at least $3 million annually thereafter. ").
9 !d. at 115.
40 !d at 124.
41 Penn Central, 438 U. S. at 124.
42 [d. at 131, 138.
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Associate Justice William Rehnquist dissented. 43 He pointed
out that there had been, "in a literal sense," a taking of Penn
Central's air rights 44 He argued "that a strong public desire to
improve the public condition is not enough to warrant" the
imposition of a "multimillion dollar loss" on Penn Central. 45

C. The Rehnquist Court
Rehuquist-who had been appointed to the Court in 1972 46 _
would serve first as Associate Justice and then as Chief Justice
until his death in 2005 47 During his thirty-three year tenure, he
advocated the protection of private property48 During his years as
an Associate Justice, none of the other Supreme Court Justices
consistently joined him in these efforts,49 but things changed in the
aftetmath ofRonaJd Reagan's ejection.
In his 1981 presidential address, President Ronald Reagan
proclaimed that "government is not the solution to our problem;
government is the problem.,,5o The economic way to discourage
governments from overusing their police power was to force tbem

43 ld. at
Chief Justice
44 Id. at
4S Id. at

138 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Rehnquist was joined in dissent by
Burgcr and Justice Stevens. ld.
143.
147, 152.
46 See Members of the Suprem e Court of the United States, SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, htlp:llwww.supremecourt.gov/about!
members_text.aspx (last visited February 9, 2012) (showing date of
appointment).
47 Supreme Court Chief Justice Rehnquist Dies, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3,
2005),
http://www.nytimes.coml2005/09/03/politics/wire-rehnquist.html?scp
~ I &s!l~ehnquist''1020dies&st=cse.
See Douglas W. Kmiec, Young Mr. Relmquist's Theory of Moral
Rights- Mostly Observed, 58 STAN. 1. REV. 1827, 1829 (2006) ("Private
property is protected as a moral extension of a person's labor. tI).
49 See R. Ted Cruz, In MemO/'iam: William H. Rehl1quist, 11 9 HARV. 1.
REv. I , 10-11 (2005) (noting that Rehnquist dissented alone so often that he was
nicknamed "The Lone Ranger").
5. President Ronald Reagan, First Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1981)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.reagan.utexas.cduJarchives/spceches/
19811l208 Ia.htm) (speaking with regard to what he perceived, at that time, as

an economic crisis).
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to internalize the cost of their regulations, both public and
.
51
pnvate.
In 1986, Reagan put in place two jurists intent on
accomplishing this goal when he elevated Rehnquist to the Chief
Justiceship and appointed Antonin Seal ia as an Associate Justice. 52
Scalia shared Rehnquist's commitment to the proposition that "the
term 'property' as used in the Taking Clause includes the entire
'group of rights inhering in the citizen's [ownership].' ,, 53 This
tandem team would consider more than thirty regulatory takings
cases-most of which were decided by a 5-to-4 or 6-to-3
majority-with Rehnquist and Scalia sometimes winning and
sometimes losing, but invariably favoring an expanded takings
jurisprudence.54
II. J UDICIAL PROCESS

Justice Scalia also had strong fee lings about the j udicial
process that the Court ought to use when deciding cases. In a 1989
aliicie in the University of Chicago Law Review, he observed that
by "making the mode of analysis relatively principled or relatively
fact-specific, the cOUlis can either establish general rules or leave
ample discretion for the future .,,55 He favored clear, previously
enunciated "bright-line" rules of law so as to promote equal

51 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC A'lALYS IS OF LAW 58 (4th cd.
1992) ("The simplest economic explanation for thc requirement of just
compensation is that it prevents the government from overusing its taking
power.").
" Bernard Weinraub, Burger Retiring, Rehnquist Named Chief; Scalia,
Appeals .Judge, Chosen for Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1986, at Al.
53 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 142
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Gen.
Motors CO<]l., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945)).
54 See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (200 1);
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 ( 1987); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 ( 1982).
55 Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law As a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv .
1175 , 1177 (1989).
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treatment and predictability rather than discretionary choices based
only upon a judge's sense of faimess and justice S6
The multifactor, ad hoc balancing test set forth in Penn
Central 57 was exactly that type of judicial decision-making which
Scalia disavowed. He therefore undertook not only to expand the
scope of the Takings Clause, but also to make its application more
principled and less fact-specific. In Scalia's view, justice would be
better-served if the ad hoc balancing approach used in Penn
Central were replaced with clea r-cut rules of compensability. 58
One such bright-line principle had already been created. When
a government action results in permanent physical occupation of
the private owner's land, it is per se compensable.59 Scalia was on
the look,out for more opportunities to create more clearly defined
categories of compensability.

A. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
(US. Supreme Court 1992)
In 1992, Scalia mustered a majority and created a new brightline rule in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. 6o A setback
line established by the South Carolina Coastal Council precluded
any construction on the landowner's two beachfront building lots
and rendered them "valueless. ,,61 Even though the landowner
conceded that the prohibition on construction was necessary to
"prevent a great public harm, ,, 62 Scalia disdained any balancing of
public benefit and private loss.63 Instead, he framed a new absolute
rule: Regulations that "den[yJ all economically beneficial or
productive use of land" are "compellSable without case-specific

51> ld.

at 1778-79.
See Penn Central, 438 U.S . at J 24.
5R See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 111C. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130
S. Ct. 2592, 2602 (2010) (plurality opinion).
59 See Loretto, 45 8 U.S. at 426.
"'Lucas v. S.c. Coastal Cowlcil, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
6 1 Id. at 1006-07.
62 l d. at 1022 (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 898
(S.c. (99 1), rev'd, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992».
63 Id. at 1024-25.
57
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inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of the
restraint.,,64 "Total takings" are per se compensable. 65
Justice Scalia, with some apparent reluctance, qualified his
total takings rule with an exception. A confiscatory regulation
might be "newly legislated or decreed (without compensation) [if
it] inhere[d] in the title itself [or] in the restrictions that
background principles of the [s ]tale's law of property and nuisance
already placer d] upon land ownership. ,,66
B. Background Principles of State Law

This exception left Scalia with a concern. While lmder the
federal system the Supreme Court of the United States had the
final say as to the meaning of the Fifth and FOUl1eenth
Amendments,67 it was the various states' high courts that had the
final say as to the inherent title limitations and background
principles of their property law and their nuisance law 68 What was
to prevent a state court from defeating "the constitutional
prohibition against taking property without due process of law by
the simple device of asserting retroactively that the property it has
taken never existed at a11"7 69 Who was to make sure that the
common law courts acted on principle when they concluded that an
apparently confiscatory regulation was excused by the background
principles that the state's law of property had already placed upon
land ownership? 70 A state court's "nmaway" common law
jurisprudence 71 might trump Scalia's per se takings rule if it were

ld. at lOIS.
See Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer jar the Perplexed, 34
ECOLOGY L.Q. 307, 328-29 (2007).
66 Lucas, 505 U.S at 1029.
67 See, e.g., id. at 1007 (showing that the Supreme Court of the United
States has final authority over matters arising under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments).
68 See Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1211 (1994)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
69 Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296-97 (1967) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
70 See McQueen v. S.C, Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 119 (S.C. 2003),
71 Todd Brower, Communities Within the Community, 7 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 203, 270 (1992).
64

65
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permitted to, "by ipse dixit, . . . transform private property into
public property. ,,72
C. Judicial Takings
Justice Scalia was well aware of the problem. In the aftermath
of the Lucas case, he remained on the lookout for an opportunity to
provide some principles as to how the Supreme Court of the
United States might prevent state courts from rendering the Lucas
opinion a "nullity" by invoking nonexistent "background laW.,,73
The Court missed its first opportnnity in 1994 in the case of
Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach. 74 Therein, the Supreme Court of
Oregon declared that the general pnblic had both a right of access
to and a right to recreational use of privately owned dry sand beach
under the ancient English doctrine of custom, which the court said
was a background principle of Oregon property law. 75
Justice Scalia dissented from the Supreme Court of the United
States' denial of the landowner's petition for a writ of certiorari. 76
After reviewing the Oregon court's vacillations on the application
of the doctrine of custom, he had serious doubts as to whether
asserted custom was just being used as an excuse to avoid the
Takings Clause. 77 Lacking the facts to evaluate the landowner's
takings claim,78 Scalia argued instead for a due process review of
whether the Supreme Court of Oregon had made a principled
ruling based upon its established common law, or whether it was
just invoking nonexistent rules of state law to justify a "land
grab.,,79 The majority of the Court refused to grant certiorari and to
follow his lead. 80

72

See Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwitb, 449 U.S. 155, 164

(1980).

Sec Stevens, 510 U.S. at 1211 (Scalia, 1., dissenting).
at 1207 (denying writ of certiorari).
at 121l (Scalia, 1., dissenting).
at 1207.
at 121 2.
at 1213.
79 Stevens, 510 U.S. at 1212, 1214.
BO ld. at 1207 (denying writ of certiorari).
73

74 1d.
751d.
76 ld.
771d.
78 ld.
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D. Tidewater Boundaries

The case of Stevens v. City a/Cannon Beach focused upon the
rights of owners holding "riparian,,81 parcels of land abutting tidal
waters. 82 In most of America's coastal states, the high water line
serves as the boundary between public property and private
property.83 These states are presumed to own the land submerged
under tidewaters up to the mean high water line (as measured by
using tidal data over a nineteen-year period) on the "foreshore.,,84
Owners of private land abutting tidewaters are presumed to own
the fast land above the mean high water line. 85 Wet sand beaches
(those between high tide and low tide) are in the public domain,
while dry sand beaches (those onl~ occasionally inundated by
tidewaters) are in the private domain. 6
By common law tradition, the owners of land abutting tidal
waters also had certain ancillary riparian rights, including the right
of access and the right to use the waters for fishing and
navigation. 87 Moreover, the riparian landowners have an additional
entitlement to gradual sedimentary accretions that increased the
territorial expanse of their fast land above the high water line 88
81 Florida and some other states distinguish between riparian parcelsthose abutting a river or stream-and "littoral parcels-those abutting an ocean,
sea, or lake. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 253.141 (West 2009) (defining riparian);
II

Kester v. Tewksbury, 701 So. 2d 443, 444 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)
(quoting Haynes v. Carbonell, 532 So. 2d 746, 748 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Cl. App.
1988) (defining the difference between riparian and littoral». This paper adopts
the practice followed in most states by referring to all sllch parcels as riparian
and the rights of all abutting landowners as "riparian rights. n See generally
BLACK'S LAW DICTTONARY 1442 (9th ed. 2009) (defining riparian rights).
82 Such parcels include oceans, gulfs, bays, and estuarine rivers. See
BLACK'S LAW DICl'IONARY 1442 (9th ed. 2009); see also SPRANKLlNG, supra
note 19.
83 See, e.g., Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl.
Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2597-98 (2010) (explaining that the foreshore, up to the
mean high water line, is owned by the state for public use).
84 fd
Borax Consol. v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10,22,27 (1935).
Jennifer A. Sullivan, Laying Out an "Unwelcome A1at rl to Public Beach
Access, 18 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 331,333-34 (2003).
87 Donna R. Christie, Of Beaches, Boundaries and Sob, 25 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 19,41 (2009).
8' fd. at 26-28.
85

86
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Conversely, riparian landowners lose their entitlement when the
foreshore gradually erodes and what had once been their fast land
falls below the high water line. 89 The legal boundary between the
public domain and the private domain is dynamic. 90
The common Jaw applied different rules when a coastal storm
or hurricane produced a large and convulsive change in shoreline.
In such cases, the boundary between the public domain and the
private domain remained the same; the riparian landowner retained
entitlement to the "avulsion" and a right to reclaim the lost
ten·itory.91
One way of reclaiming the shoreline was by "beach
replenishment" projects that pumped large quantities of submerged
sand back up ' onto the foreshore. 92 Few, if any, individuals
reclaimed their private beachfront after a major storm loss because
of the engineering difficulties and high costS. 93 Local
govenunents, however, did undertake such projects on a larger
scale in an effort to restore the recreational value of town
beaches 94

" [d. at 28-29.
90 See H ENRY FARNHAM, THE L AW OF W ATERS AND W ATER RIGHTS 32024 (1904) (explaining the different rules that apply to the wet sand area versus
the dry sand area and the impact of reliction, avulsion, and accretion on those
rules). In the event of reliction (gradual expansion of the foreshore resulting
from lowering of the water level), riparian landowners might also expand their
territory.
91 [d. The state would take title by adverse possession when the riparian
landowner failed to reclaim a submerged avulsion within the time prescribed by
the statute of limitations. [d. at 320-21.
92 See Christie, supra note 87, at 37-3 9, 63.
93 See id. at 43 (illustrating reluctance to rebuild after a major storm loss);
see also James G. Titus, Planning/or Sea Level Rise Before and After a Coastal
Disaster,
www.EPA.GOv,
http://www.epa.goy/climatechange/effects/
downloads/Challenge_chaptcrS.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2012) (explaining a
reluctance to rebuild after a major storm loss due to tinancial difficulties).
94

ORRIN H. PILKEY & KA THARlNE L. DIXON, THE CORPS AND THE SHORE

75-85 (\996).
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E. Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renouri shment, Inc. (Florida
Supreme Court 2008)

A case testing the constitutionality of a law modifying riparian
rights, called Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment,
Inc.,95 arose in Florida. 96 In 2003, a tidewater county had
undertaken to restore 6.9 miles of eroding bcachfront 97 The plan
called for "add[in~] about 75 feet of dry sand seaward of the mean
high-water line.,, 9 The procedures prescribed by the Florida Beach
and Shore Preservation Act 99 called for some modifications to the
common law riparian rights of the abutting private landowners. 100
The first step in a restoration project was establishment of "an
erosion control line [to] be set by reference to the existing . . .
high-water line." 10 1 Sand was then dumped seaward ofthe erosioncontrol line on submerged land so as to raise it above the water
level. 102 Thereafter:
The fixed erosion-control line replaces the fluctuating
mean high-water line as the boundary between privately
owned [riparian] property and state property. Once the
erosion-control line is recorded, the common law ceases
to increase upland property by accretion (or decrease it by
erosion) . Thus, when accretion to the shore moves the
mean high-water line seaward, the property of beachfront
landowners is not extended to that line (as the prior law
provided), but remains bounded by the permanent
erosion-control line. 103

95 Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102
(Fla. 2008). afJ'd sub /lorn. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Jnc. v . Fla. Oep't of
Envt!. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010).
96 1d. at 1105.
97 Stop the Beach, 130 S. ct. at 2600.

" ld.

" FLA. STAT. A~N. §§ 16 1.011-.242 (West 2006).
100 See Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2599-600.
IOl ld. at 2599; § 16 1.161(3)-(5).
102 Stop the Beach, J 30 S. Ct. at 2599.
103 Id. (citations omitted).
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Under the Beach and Shore Preservation Act, landowners
retained all of their common law riparian rights other than the right
to accretions. 104 The Act further stated that if the use of submerged
land would "unreasonably infringe on riparian rights," then the
proj ect could not go forward. 105
A group of the beachfront property owners who owned parcels
abutting the beachfront project on its landward side brought an
action claiming that the Act was, on its face, an unconstitutional
taking of their property. 106
On fust impression, it would seem that the private owners of
beachfront parcels had scant claim to compensation under the
existing constitutional takings jurisprudence. Granted, the property
rights associated with their parcels had been partially taken as a
result of their loss of the right of accretion. But according to the
landmark case of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York, " '[tlaking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into
discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a
particular segment have been entirely abrogated." 107 This
"indivisibility principle" has been reiterated time and again in
subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. 108
Penn Central then went on to specifY the procedure for
evaluating such partial takings of an entire individual parcel: "In
deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a
taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of the action

§ 161.201.
FL. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 18-21.004(3)(b) (2009); see also SlOp the
Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2599-600 (explaini ng the beach restoration project and the
consequences ofthe agency not following certain instructions).
106 Walton County v. Stop the Beach Rcnourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d
1102, 1106-07 (Fla. 2008), affd sub nom. Stop the Beach Ren ourishmcnt, Inc. v.
Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010). The Pacific Legal Foundation,
a conservative group dedicated to the protection of private property, filed a bricf
amici curiae. /d. at 1105. It presumably sponsored the litigation. See id.
\07 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130
(1978) (emphasis added).
108 See. e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 339 (2002); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 401
(1994); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491-92
(1987); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 55 (1979). But see Hodel v. Irving, 481
U.S. 704, 711 (1 987).
104

105
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and on the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the
,,109
parceI as a woe
h I ....
Applying that viewpoint to the case at hand, the beachfront
owners had lost no territorial portion of their parcels. I 10 Their
investment-backed expectation in full access and enjoyment of the
adjacent beach and ocean waters was assured. II I Since parcels
bordering an expansive beach are typically more valuable than
parcels bordering an eroding beach, it is likely that the project will
increase the value of the owners' beachfront property; it is unlikely
that the owners' beach front property has suffered any economic
IOSS. 112 All that the owners have lost is the possibility of future
accretions- such accretions that were unlikely to occur on a
historically eroding beachfront.' 13 The character of the
government's action was designed to protect the shore from storm
damage and to provide the benefits of a recreational beach for the
property owner as well as the whole town. 114 On balance, the
public benefits of beach preservation outweighed the insignificant
private loss suffered by the beach front owners. 11 5
Recognizing the difficulties of prevailing under a Penn
Central theory, the beachfront property owners recast their claim
as a Lucas challenge. 116 Instead of alleging that the Beach and
Shore Preservation Act was a p31tial taking of their parcels, they
alleged that the Act was a total taking of their "special light" to
accretions, which were akin to easements under Florida property

Penn Central, 438 U.S. a1130.
See Stop the Beach, [30 S. Ct. a12599.
111 See id.
" ' ld. at 26[2.
"'Id. at 2600. Per contra, the beachfron! property owners could have
argued a [ass of their right to privacy. Before the project, strangers could only
traverse the beach in front of their property on the wet sand when the tide was
down; aftcr the project, strangers could traverse along the beach in front of their
property on the public dty sand at any time.
" ' See Christie, supra note 87, at 37-38.
" ' Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d
1102, 11 20-2 1 (Fla. 2008) (illustrating that the inconvenience to property
owners was so insignificant that their interest did not outweigh the public's
interest in maintaining the beaches), affd sub nom. Stop the Beach
Renourislunent, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., [30 S. Ct. 2592 (2010).
116 ld. at 1105.
109

11 0
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law.1I7 Since there had been a deprivation of all beneficial use of
their right to accretions, the owners claimed to be entitled to
compensation, regardless of the public interest advanced in support
of the project. 11 8
The Supreme Cour t of Florida determined that the Beach and
Shore Preservation Act did not unconstitutionally deprive
beachfront property owners of their right to accretion, regardless of
whether its impact was viewed as a partial taking or total taking. 119
As summarized by the Supreme Court of the United States, the
Florida court concluded that compensation was due in neither case
because the regulatory limitation "inhere[d] in tbe . .. background
principles of the ~sJtate' s law of property ... already place[d] npon
land ownership." 2
Under the Supreme Court of Florida's view, the right to
accretion was a contingent right. 121 The Act, in keeping with the
common law, struck "a reasonable balance of interests and rights to
uniquely valuable and [fragile] propeli y.'01 22 Beach renonrishment
protected vital public economic and natmal resomces; it protected
property owners from futlU'e storm damage and erosion; and it
preserved the property owner's rights to access, use, and view the
tidewaters. 12l Based on this ad hoc, fac t-specific balancing
exercise, tbe Florida comt concluded that no property had been
taken and no compensation was due. 124 This was exactly the type
of jndicial deci sion making that Scalia disavowed. 125

II' /d. at 1105, 111 2, 1115.
118 Id. at 1105-07, II1I (reexamining on appeal the owners' original claim
that they were deprived of their right to accretion and therefore entitled to
compensation, regardl ess of the public interest argument).
" ' Id. at 1116.
120 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992); see Walton
County, 998 So. 2d at 111 6-21.
121 Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1112, 1118.
122 Id. at 111 5.
123Id. at 1120.
124 Id. at 11 20-21.
125 Scalia, supra note 55, at 1177, 1187.
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F. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of
Environmental Protection (U.s. Supreme Court 2010)
The beachfront property owners advanced a novel claim when
they petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of
certiorari. In the Supreme Court of Florida, the owners had claimed
that the Florida Legislature's Beach and Shore Preservation Act
had unconstitutionally deprived them of their right to accretion in
violation of the Takings Clause-and lost. 126 Now, in the Supreme
Court of the United States, they advanced the claim that it was the
Supreme Court of Florida's decision in the Walton County case that
had unconstitutionally deprived them of their rights in violation of
the Takings Clause. I27 The beachfront property owners claimed
that there had been a "judicial taking.,,128
I. Writ of Certiorari
The Supreme Court of the United States granted a writ of
certiorari, but after hearing the case, the Court unanimouslyI29 held
that the petitioners were not entitled to compensation. I30 The
unanimity of opinion seems somewhat surprising. Because
granting of the writ requires the votes of four Justices at
conference, this ordinarily means that at least four Justices have
initially found the circumstances described in the petition as
sufficient to warrant further scrutiny. 131 But in this instance, none
of the Justices found the petitioners' claim appealing. Why, then,
did the Court grant certiorari in the first place? Perhaps the
anomaly can be understood as the result of tactical

\26 Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S.
Ct. 2592, 2600 (2010); see supra text accompanying notes 99-124 (explaining
the Supreme Court of Florida's analysis of its Beachfront Preservation Act).
127 Stop the Beach, 130 S. ct. at 2597.
128 I d. at 2597, 2600-01.
129 Eight justices joined in this judgment: Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, and Sotomayor. See
id. at 2597. Justice Stevens, as a Florida landowner, recused himself. [d. at 2613.
130 See id. at 2597, 2601, 2613.
131
Writs of Certiorari,
UNITED
STATES
SUPREME
COURT,
http://www. uscowts.gov/EdueationalResources/ConstitutionResources/Separati
onOfPowerslUSSupremeCourtProcedures.aspx (last visited Feb. 9, 2012).
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"gamesmanshif by the four property rights advocates on the
Roberts Court. 32
After the death of William Rehnquist in 2005, John Roberts
became Chief Justice. 133 Antonin Scalia, as the Senior Justice on
the Roberts Court, found his view that governments should be
required to pay all of the private property costs associated with
regulation now shared by the Chief Justice, long-time ally Clarence
Thomas, and newcomer Samuel Alito. 134
This Gang of Four had two reasons for wanting to hear the
case in the Supreme Court. First, in the Florida court below, the
beachfront landowners argued that the statute completely took their
right of accretion (a right akin to an easement), which was
categorically compensable without regard to the magnitude of the
loss or the public interest at stake. 135 But when making this
argument, they ignored Penn Central's "parcel as a whole" rule136:
" 'Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into
discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a
particular segment have been entirely abrogated." 137 The case
afforded an opportunity to definitively overrule this
"nondivisibility" I3 approach and to can for the separate evaluation
of the right of accretion and all other "sticks in the bundle" of
property rights, one at a time.139 Second, the case provided the
chance to create a precedent for the novel proposition that federal
courts had the power to collaterally attack and reverse state court
decisions which evaded the requirements of the Takings Clause

132 See, e.g., Stop the Beach, 130 S. ct. at 2597 (illustrating these four
Justices joining together on one side in a takings case).
133 Justin Quinn, A Profile of Supreme Court Justice John Roberts,

ABOUT. COM ,

http://usconservatives.about.com/od/championsipiRobcrtsJ llO.htm (last visited
Feb. 9, 2012).
134 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
135 Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishrnent, Inc., 998 So. 2d
1102, 1111 (Fla. 2008), affd sub nom. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v.
Fla. Dctt ofEnvt!. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010).
" Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31
(1978).
IJ7 fd.
" . See Dolan v. City ofTigard, 512 U.S. 374, 401 (1 994).
139 See Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2601-02, 2605 (plurality opinion).
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with pretextual background principles of the state's law of
property. 140
If the four property rights advocates could attract one
additional vote, they might refOlmulate takings jurisprudence to
provide constitutional protection "to each part of an endowment of
private property ... e~ual to the protection it affords the wholeno more and no less." 41 Every taking would be a total taking. 142
Moreover, the opin ion could serve as a precedent holding that an
unprincipled judicial action might result in an unconstitutional
taking.
But after certiorari was granted and the case was heard, the
fifth vote was not to be found. 143 Having failed in their best efforts
to convince the majority to award compensation, the Gang of Four
found their tactical interests best-served by joinin,? the majority
opinion affirming the Supreme COlu"! of Florida. 14 By voting to
affirm, Scalia made himself eligible to write the opinion of the
Supreme Court. 145 Therein, he could carefully craft his language in
the opinion of the Court so as not to endorse the "parcel as a
whole" rule. 146 Moreover, he could inclnde plurality opinions on
behalf of himself and his three property rights associates that
reified his concept of judicial takin s and publicized his general
principles of takings jurispmdence. 14

9

2. Opinion of the Court
Justice Scalia announced the tmanimous judgment of the
Supreme COUl"! of the United States 148 that the Supreme Court of
Florida had not contravened property rights of the petitioners in

See id. at 2608-10 (2010).
supra note 5.
l42 [d.
143 See Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2597 (showing that a fifth vote could
nol be obtained for Parts II and III oflhe opin ion).
144 See id. at 2613.
145 See id. at 2597.
l46 See id. at 2602-03, 2605 (plural ity opinion).
l47 SeeM. at 260.1-10.
l4S [d.
at 2597 (majority opinion) ; see supra notes 129-30 and
1<0

141 EpSTEIN,

accompanying text.
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violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. I49 And, on
behalf of the Court, Justice Scalia explained why the total taking of
the right to accretions was not compensable in the Stop the Beach
case. 150
He might have accepted the analysis of the Supreme Court of
Florida. The Supreme Court of Florida had detennined that under
background principles of the state's law of property, the right to
accretion was contingent and subject to legislative modification or
elimination because, on balance, the public interest in protecting
the shoreline outweighed the private interest. 151 But that approach
involved exactly that sort of multi factor, fact-specific,
discretionary judicial decision making that Scalia rejected as a rule
of judges rather than a rule oflaw. I52
Instead, Scalia created a bright-line explanation of his own as
to why "the right [to accretion] was not implicated by the beachrestoration project" 153 He characterized the beach restoration
project as an "avulsion" on the state-owned submerged tidal land;
as such, the State retained title when it altificially filled the land. 154
Since the beachfront property owners no longer owned any land
abutting the water, they no longer had any riparian rightS. I55
Florida's background principles of property law-not any
legislative or judicial action-had taken the right to accretions;
thus, no compensation was due. 156
Justice Scalia characterized his conclusion as "counterintuitive" since it pennitted state-created landfill projects to
deprive riparian landowners of their waterfront expectations
without compensation. 157 But worse than that, it reflects a tortured
misunderstanding (or manipulation) of the common law doctrine of

Stop the Beach, 130 S. CI. at 2597, 2613.
See generally id. at 26 10-2613.
151 Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d
1102, 1112, 1\15, 1120-2 1 (Fla. 2008), ajfd sub 1/0111. Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010).
152 Scalia, supra note 55, at 1177, 1187.
153 Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2612.
154Id. at 2611.
15' Id.
156 Id. at 2612 .
157Id.
149

150
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avulsion. Ordinarily, water bonndaries between parcels slowly
change with the natnral buildup or erosion of the banks of the
watercourse. 158 In the event, however, of a sudden change caused
by events such as coastal storms, floods, or earthquakes (called
avulsions), the boundaries do not change, and the landowners
retain ownership of their original parcels. 159 To classify statecreated artificial landfill projects as avulsions is at odds with the
ordinary meaning of the word and a mischaracterization of the
customary common law. 160 Scalia found no real support for this
classification in Florida precedents. 161 Moreover, nnder a federal
system, it seems preswnptuously inappropriate for the Supreme
Court of the United States to be overruling the Supreme Court of
Florida on the applicable Florida property law. 162
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court had avoided ad hoc
balancing and had instead conjured up a bright-line rule explaining
why total deprivation of the beachfront landowners' loss of the
right to accretion was not compensable-because of the statecreated landfill, they no longer owned land abutting the
waterway.163 In the creation of this rule, Scalia had misapplied the
doctrine of avulsion and violated a basic precept of federalism. The
other seven Justices, satisfied with the outcome, raised no
objection to Scalia's mode of analysis.
3. Plurality Opinions

Justices Scalia, Roberts, Thomas, and Alito also had in mind
several other reforms to the regulatory taking jurisprudence that

Feig v. Graves, 100 So. 2d 192, 196 (Fla. 1958).
Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2598-99.
160 SINGER, supra note 17, at 174 (explaining what an avulsion is and, in
turn, illustrating how a state-created artificial landfill cannot be one).
161 See generally Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2597-2613 (lacking any
Florida cases to show support for the defmition of avulsion as including artificial
landfill projects).
162 Blue Cross & Blue Sbield of Ala., Inc. v. Nielsen, 116 F.3d 1406, 1413
(11 th Cir. 1997) (stating that state courts are the final arbiters of state law due to
federalism, a doctrine which recognizes a court system for both the fcderal
government and each state government).
163 Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2599, 2611.
158

159
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would provide greater protection for private property rights. 164 But
with respect to these, they lacked the fifth vote. Scalia appended
these proposals to his opinion of the Court in Stop the Beach as
plurality opinions of the Gang of Four. 165
Ill. JUDICIAL TAKlNGS

The writ of certiorari had been granted to consider the
question of whether the Florida court of last resort had violated the
Takings Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments when it
denied the beachfront property owners compensation for the taking
of their property.1 66 This question had been rendered moot by the
holding of the Court on the merits that there had been no
constitutional taking. 167 But as spokesman for the Gang of Four,
Justice Scalia (without regard to the doctrine of judicial
constitutional avoidance)168 seized the opportunity to reify the
concept of judicial takings. 169
Scalia's dicta began by pointing out that the Constitution
included "no textual justification for saying . . . . that takin~s
effected by the judicial branch are entitled to special treatment." I 0
He then went on to respond to conflicting views expressed in the
separate opinions authored by Justices Breyer and Kennedy. The
Justices quibbled back and forth on questions of ripeness,
constitutional avoidance, jurisdiction, separation of powers, due
process, sovereign immunity, and remedies. 171 But all of the
Justices seemed to agree that if and when a state court intentionally

See id. at 260 I-I 0 (plurality opinion).
See id.
166 ld. at 2597 (majority opinion).
167 See id. at 2613 (holding that the property rights and constitutional rights
of the petitioners were not violated).
168 The doctrine of constitutional avoidance suggests that the Supreme
Court of the United States should, as a matter of self-restraint, refuse to rule on
constitutional issues when a case can be decided on. nonconstitutional grounds.
See Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. U.S. Dep't of
Homeland Sec., 527 F.2d 76, 98 (D.c. 2007).
169 See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REv. 1449,
1449-50 (1990).
170 Stop the Beach, 130 S. CI. at 2601 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted).
17 1 See generally id. at 2603-05,2608.
164

165
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misrepresents the principles of its state property law so as to avoid
the Takings Clause, it has violated the Constitution. 172 And the real
conundrum relates to the standard or test that should be used to
determine when a state court has invoked nonexistent "background
law."I 73
The problem was complicated by the common law tradition
that allows for judge-made incremental modifications to property
law. 174 Indeed, there may be a special need for flexibility with
respect to common law rights to the shore and beaches. In the
nineteenth century, the public policies behind riparian rights
supported the filling of malarial marsh, industrial development,
and disposal of wastes. 175 In the twentieth century, public goals
shifted towards wetland protection, pollution controls, and
recreational waterfronts. 176 As the public policy concerning
waterfront development evolved from exploitation to conservation,
some state courts felt a necessity to modify their law of riparian
rights. 177 There was no clear answer as to when and whether such
changes went "too far" and became confiscatory.
As to what ought to be the standard for judicial takings,
Justice Scalia was outspoken. He rejected all of the proposed tests
("sudden," "unpredictable," lacking of a "fair and substantial
basis,,,]78 or involving an "abandonment of settled principIes,,]79)
as proving too much and too little. 180 Scalia's new bright-line rule
would deem it a total taking whenever a state action results in the
deprivation of any established property right. lS I A corollary to that

Id. at 2602.
See id. at 2612-13 (majority opinion).
174Id. at 2606 (plurality opinion).
175 See Esson v. Wattier, 34 P. 756, 757 (Or. 1893); Billee Wiener,
Wetlands Regulation and Mitigation Afler th e Florida Environmental
Reorganization Actof1993, 8 J. LAND Usc& ENVTL. L 521 , 529 (1993).
176 See, e.g, Atlas Chern. Indus. v. Anderson, 514 S.W.2d 309,31 9 (Tex.
172

173

1974) (imposing punitive damages on polluters).
177 See, e.g. , Wiener, supra note 175, at 528-29.
178 Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2610 (plurality opinion).
179 See id. at 26 15 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
19o See id. at 2610 (plurality opinion).
18J fd. at 2602, 2608.
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rule made any state judicial attempt to disestablish that property
right an unconstitutional judicial taking. 182
Under the present state of federal jurisdiction, a power in the
federal courts to overturn judicial takings would have had little
183
gives the federal courts
effect. The Civil Rights Act of 1871
jurisdiction to redress state actions violating the Fourteenth
Amendment. 184 Supreme Court precedents, however, provide an
exhaustion principle requiring taking claimants to have a final state
court judgment before seeking federal relief. 185 Moreover, another
Supreme Court precedent makes state court judges immune from
186
Hence, the victims of state judicial
federal civil rights suitS.
takings lack jurisdictional access to the lower federal courts. Their
only opportunity for a federal court challenge to a state court's
judicial taking would be on writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court
of the United States. Since the Court only hears seventy-five to
eighty cases each term,1 87 it cannot begin to oversee the bona fides
of the behavior of the high court in each of the fifty states.
But the Court might change its mind. Both of these limitations
on federal jurisdiction-the exhaustion principle and the immunity
of state judges- are the creation of Supreme Court precedents. 188
Several Justices have already expressed the view that the
requirement that "the claimant ... seek compensation in state court
before bringin~ a federal takings claim in federal court" should be
reconsidered. 1 9 The judicial immunity doctrine has been the
subject of scathing scholarly attack. 190

Id. at 2608.
Act of Apr. 20. 1871. ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2006».
184 tit. 42, § 1983.
185 Williamson Cnty. Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson
City, 473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985).
186 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553 (1967).
187 Frequently Asked Questions, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/faq.aspx#faqgi9 (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
188 See Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 195; Pierson, 386 U.S. at 553.
189 San Remo Hotel v. City & COlmty of San Francisco, California, 545
U.S. 323, 349 (2005) (Rehnquist, C.l, concurring).
190 See generally Robert Craig Waters, Judicial Immunity vs. Due Process:
When Should a Judge Be Subject to Suit?, 7 CATO J. 461 (1987) (referencing
182

183
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Perhaps the Gang of Four property rights advocates on the
Court will endeavor to overrule these precedents and to redirect
regulatory taking cases hack into federal district courts. The federal
district courts would then, as a matter of course, certify questions
of state law to the state supreme courts. The federal district courts
would then be well-positioned to consider whether or not the state
courts' written answers were setting forth nonexistent background
principles of the state's law of property. The concept of judicial
takings would permit the federal district courts to, in each and
every case, scrutinize whetber state court judges were evading the
requirements of the Takings Clause with pretextual background
principles of state law.
General Principles of Takings Jurisprudence
In another section of Justice Scalia's opinion (joined by
Justices Roherts, Thomas, and Alita), he undertakes- with
seeming diffidence- to "discuss some general principles of our
takings jurisprudence." 191 Although he mentions "the landmark
case of Penn Central TransfportationJ Co. v. [City o.Q New York,"
he relegates it to footnote without further mention. 19 Perhaps by
ignoring Penn Central, he hopes to make it go away.
Scalia's dislike of the judicial method used in the Penn Central
Court's opinion is on the record. He favors a mode of analysis in
takings jurisprudence based upon clear, previously enunciated
rules of law and not upon discretionary judge-made choices based
upon the balanc ing of many factors. 193 Moreover, he did not
approve of the outcomes. Penn Central's central proposition was
that" '[tJaking' jurispmdence does not divide a single parcel into
discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a
particular segment have been entirely abrogated." 194 Because the
many dangers of judicial immunity with respect to corruption and error in the
judiciary).
191 Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S.
Ct. 2592, 2601 (2010) (plurality opinion).
192 !d. at 2603 n.6.
193 Scalia, supra note 55, at 11 78.
194 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130
(1978) (holding that air rights over Grand Central Station are not a separate
property interest).
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Grand Central Station parcel as a whole had residual value, this
viewpoint was used to legitimize the City of New York's
imposition of a loss of 40 million dollars' worth of air rights on
Penn Central. 195
Scalia instead wanted the Takings Clause to protect all of the
rights inhering in ownership and to thereby discourage states from
overusing their police power by forcing them to internalize all of
the public and private costs associated with their regulations. l96
But, unable to overrule Penn Central without the fifth vote, Scalia
worked to undermine it. His discussion in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council marginalized Penn Central by making no mention
of the nondivisibility principle. 197
Scalia's Lucas opinion jumped to th e conclusion that the right
to accretion was the relevant" 'property interest' against which the
[beachfront landowners'] loss of value [was] to be measured.,,1 98
By doing so, he aimed to characterize the abrogation of the right to
accretion as a deprivation of all economically beneficial use that
was "compensable without case-specific inquiry into the public
interest advanced in support of the restraint.'''99 As such. the total
taking was per se compensable under the Lucas test.
Scalia's only justification for this "conceptual severance,,200
was a citation to the nineteenth-century case of Yates v.
Milwaukee.201 But the Yates case was not on point; the Court had
only held compensation to be due when a city navigation ordinance
required the owner to remove a private wharf from a watelway202
It was the private wharf that was the relevant property interest and

[d. at 137.
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council. 505 U.S. 1003, 1026 (1992).
197 See generally id. at 1004 (making no mention of tbe nondiv isibility
principle). But see Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 401 (1994)
(discussing the nondivisibility principle).
19< Lucas. 505 U.S. at 1016 & D. 7.
199 !d. at 101 5.
200 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency,
535 U.S. 302, 331 (2002) (coining the conceptual severance principle).
20J Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. V . Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. , 130 S.
Ct. 2592, 260 1 (2010) (plurality opinion) (citing Yates V. Milwaukee, 77 U.S.
497,497 (1871) (recognizing conceptual severance».
202 Yates, 77 U.S. at 507.
195

196
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not the unexercised riparian right which only became constitutional
property "when once vested. ,,203
In Stop the Beach, Scalia's di scussion of the general principles
of the taking jurisprudence used an off-point precedent from the
nineteenth century to trump an on-point landmark decision from
the twentieth century-and the decisions that followed it. He
considered the wordplay of classifying some rights as compensable
easements and other rights as noncompensable contingent future
interests, but rejected it. Instead, he concluded that riparian rights
and all other established rights were discrete segments of
property,204 the abrogation of which would be categorically
compensable as a taking. Stop the Beach was only a plurality
opinion, but the other Justices seemed not to have noticed. They
made no criticism of Scalia's selection of precedents or language.
Scalia's dicta had set the stage for the proposition that the
beachfront landowners' right to receive future accretions (and other
liparian rights) was separately and fully protected by the Takings
Clause.
CONCLUSION

The opinion in Stop the Beach found four Justices intent on
empowering federal courts to prevent state courts from invading
the Takings Clause with pretextual background principles of the
state's law of property. With a certain irony, their spokesman
misstated the Florida property law principles with respect to
avulsion. Justice Scalia was unable to muster a majority, but his
arguments seem to have convinced the other Justices of the
concept of judicial takings upon proof of a state court's intentional
misrepresentation of its state property .Iaw.
Twenty-five years a~o, law professor Richard A. Epstein, in
his 1985 book Takings ,z 5 advanced a radical theory of absolute
property rights: "All regulations ... are takings of private property
prima facie compensable by the [S]tate. ,,206 His central thesis was
that "[t]he protection afforded by the [Takings C]lause to each part
203

[d. at 504.
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of an endowment of private property is e~ual to the protection it
affords the whole-no more and no less." 07 At the time, Epstein
seemed out of touch with the holdings of the Supreme Court of the
United States. In Pennsylvania Coal, the Court had held that
"propelty may be regulated to a certain extent," and only if it "goes
too far [will it] be recognized as a taking.,,208 In Penn Central, the
Court had held "that government rnay execute laws . . . that
adversely affect recognized economic values," so long as "the law
does not interfere with ... [the] primary expectation concerning
the use of the parcel.,,209
The opinion in Slop the Beach, however, now finds four
Justices intent on advancing Epstein's absolute theory of property
rights. If the Gang of Four can get the fifth vote, they would dump
the multifactor, ad hoc, fact-specific test set forth in Penn Central
into the trash bin of history. No longer would public benefit be
balanced against private loss. Each and every "deprivation of an[y]
established property right,,210 will be a total taking.
Ronald Reagan observed that "government is not the solution
to our problem; government is the problem.,,211 Oliver Wendell
Holmes Jr. observed that "[g]overnment hardly could go on if to
some extent values incident to property could not be diminished
without paying for every such change in the generallaw.,,212 If the
Gang of Four can get the fifth vote that "breaks the bundle of
property rights" so that "deprivation of anyone of the sticks in the
bundle" is a compensable taking, there will be much less
government. Whether there will be fewer problems remains to be
seen.
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